

# Intelligence Gathering of the Mongolian Empire<sup>1</sup>

By Jonathan King

North Georgia College and State University

The armies of the Mongolian Empire dominated the continent of Asia and on the verge of invading Europe and Africa during the thirteenth century and into the fourteenth century before collapsing from within. They moved through the continent with such wide range environments<sup>2</sup> using an unstoppable violence of action against their enemies, who could only hold them off until the empire imploded. The Mongols possessed very distinct combination of fighting involving mobility and most importantly coordination. Their coordination abilities created one of the the most organized armies of the thirteenth century. The key to their successful coordination and organization was their systems of intelligence and communication.<sup>3</sup> Historian Francis Dvornik argues “the important factor which facilitated his conquest was Jenghiz’s understanding of the importance of possessing good intelligence about any nation about to be conquered.”<sup>4</sup> Gaining intelligence on the nations surrounding his domain and other nations beyond his reach, Chinggis Khan planned his conquest as the mandated ruler of the world.<sup>5</sup>

The Mongols never campaigned without any intelligence and they collected it from different aspects.<sup>6</sup> Mongol military intelligence is the key factor for their domination of Asia through the use of symmetrical and asymmetrical elements such as the *yam*, spies, and travelling

---

<sup>1</sup> Note this paper used the spelling of terms and names out of Timothy May, *The Art of Mongol War* (Yardley: Westholme Publishing, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> Continent of Asia has every environment possible from dessert, mountains, grasslands, and seas.

<sup>3</sup> Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 372. The author also argues “the nomads instinct for landmarks and direction” as another key for their coordination.

<sup>4</sup> Francis Dvornik, *Origins of Intelligence Services* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), 274. Dvornik uses examples of Mongol intelligence such as China where attacked in more than one place and attacked an unexpected point in the “Great Wall.” This attack would not have been possible without the use of an intelligence service, pg 265.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 275.

<sup>6</sup> May, 69. The variety of forces which gathered the intelligence was merchants, spies, the *alginchin* (scouts), and expeditionary forces dealing with specific threats to the empire.

merchants. Friar Giovanni DiPlano Carpini claimed, “He who listens shall be wiser and shall have the knowledge to command,”<sup>7</sup> very true for the Mongols and their use of intelligence.

The most surprising result of the conquest of Asia was the rule of the continent under one leader and the establishment of a communication system which passed information between Europe and Mongolia and vice a versa.<sup>8</sup> The *yam*, or post system, gathered and delivered intelligence throughout the empire. This system used a courier on horseback relaying information between the khan and his generals.<sup>9</sup> Running the empire would have been impossible without this system and what usually took months of riding, only took days for delivering a message or intelligence. Messengers ensured the transportation of royal orders and intelligence with the use of horses and post set up at certain distances.<sup>10</sup>

Historian Francis Dvornik provides the most details on the *yam* system in his book *Origins of Intelligence Services*. The *yam* system established posts along roads “at a distance of a day’s journey,” about twenty-five or thirty miles on foot, and held horses, fodder, and provision for the messengers. These posts kept around 400 horses ready for switching off with messengers for speedy trips throughout the empire.<sup>11</sup> Official messengers and ambassadors used the service

---

<sup>7</sup> Giovanni DiPlano Carpini, *The Story of the Mongols Whom We Call the Tartars*, trans. Erik Hildinger (Boston: Branden Publishing Company, 1996), 93.

<sup>8</sup> David Morgan, “Persian perceptions of Mongols and Europeans”, in *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting On the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples In the Early Modern Era*, ed. Stuart B. Schwartz (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1994), 203. Morgan explains how the continent opened up cultural influences taking affect on the continent through the *yam*. He uses the example of Persia and how “Chinese motifs found their way, most beneficially, into Persian art, especially miniature painting and ceramics. Some of the Persian historical writing of the Mongol era shows a breadth of interest and knowledge on the part of its authors that had not been shown by their predecessors and was not, regrettably, to be evident either in the work of their successors.”

<sup>9</sup> Dvornik, 276. Chinggis Khan was “well aware that a ruler need to be well informed about the situation in conquered countries and that he has to be in continuous contact, not only with the generals of his armies, but also with his homeland.”

<sup>10</sup> Information on the *yam* found in May, 69-71, David Morgan, *The Mongols*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 90-4, and Montgomery of Alamein, 372. Messengers known as ‘Arrow Riders’ and received the best of horses and provisions. Morgan, on page 90, claims the system’s “organization and efficiency were among the features of Mongol government that most impressed European observers.”

<sup>11</sup> Dvornik, 290. He explains how cities provided the support for these posts as tribute for the khan. A station kept ready only 200 horses while another 200 kept in the field for grazing. A post near a lake provided boats for crossing,

for free while everyone else paid post service taxes posed on them. High level messengers, or *elci*, bandaged themselves for long journeys and carried a *paiza*, an object that told the level of importance of the messenger.<sup>12</sup> Messengers while on horses could cover somewhere in between 200 and 250 miles a day.<sup>13</sup> While on duty messengers also had extra taskings of acting as spies and undercover agents charged with gathering intelligence on areas they travelled through.<sup>14</sup> The stations also spied on private travelers, profiting from hearing merchants speaking on things they saw on their travels. An example of the success of this institution Sübedei's ride from the Caspian Sea with intelligence of his forced reconnaissance exemplifies the great success of the *yam*.<sup>15</sup>

Historians present different origins of the mandate which established the *yam*. Some believe Chinggis Khan instituted it through the *yasa*, Mongol law, while others argue his successor, Ögödei, did.<sup>16</sup> The Mongol ruling class considered the organization and implantation

---

around three or four, and messengers received enough provisions for a dessert crossing. He derived these facts from Marco Polo, *The Description of the World*, ed. and trans. A.C. Moule and P. Pelliot (London:, 1938). Historian Karl A. Wittfogel contrasts this with horse numbers with somewhere between thirty to fifty from the accounts of Sigismund von Herbertein (*Notes Upon Russia: Being a Translation of the Earliest Account of that Country Entitled Rerum Mosociticarum Commentarii*, trans. and ed. R. H. Major, Vol 1, London 1851-52, 95.) in his article "Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast," *Slavic Review*, vol. 22 no. 4 (December 1963): 639, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2492560> (accessed April 8, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> Morgan, 91. He mentioned how the riders wrapped themselves in bandages, preventing body injuries from riding. He describes the *paiza* "might be of wood, silver or gold, and in some cases have a tiger or a gerfalcon at its head, depending on the rank and importance of the holder."

<sup>13</sup> Wittfogel, 639-40. He reported Sigismund von Herbertein account of the Muscovite's in Russia still using the *yam* and how one of his servants covered 500 miles from Novgorod to Moscow (500 kilometers) in three days' time.

<sup>14</sup> Dvornik, 291-3. Dvornik describes Marco Polo's journey as an envoy for Kubilai Khan and how they had other duties besides delivering messages. He expected detailed reports messengers had from their mission and if they had nothing the khan called them ignorant. Dvornik also states that Marco Polo confessed "that he knew about this and , when sent on a mission, he paid attention to all novelties, rumors, and strange things he might hear or observe, and the khan greatly appreciated his reports."

<sup>15</sup> Dvornik, 276-7. Sübedei rode day and night stopping at the *yams* only for horse exchanges and sometimes food and sleep. He covered 1,200 miles in a little over a week. Another example of this is the arrival of a messenger reporting on Ögödei's death which inadvertently saved Europe from invasion.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 276. Dvornik argues Chinggis Khan instituted the *yam* as it was mentioned in the *yasa*. Problem with this is that there is no actual record of the *yasa*. Several historians have pieced it together from sources such *The Secret History of the Mongols*, Juvaini's *Genghis Khan: The History of the World Conquerer*, and Rashid al-Din's *The Successors of Genghis Khan*. Historian Bertold Spuler has the *yasa* listed in his book, *History of the Mongols*, trans. Helga and Stuart Drummond (New York: Dorset press, 1988), 40-1. Morgan argues in book, page 91, Ögödei

of the *yam* a major task for the empire.<sup>17</sup> Historians consider this system, “The most effective of Mongol imperial institution after the army. By and large it seems to have worked, though with interruptions caused by warfare among the Mongol Khanates, and its influence was widespread.”<sup>18</sup> Successful examples grew across the empire and continued after its fall such as the Mamlūk’s *barīd*, the Ottoman’s *ulak*, and other courier services in Persia and the Delhi Sultanate.<sup>19</sup>

Historians also question how the Mongols achieved a system of this nature, whether they developed it themselves or if it originated from another nation.<sup>20</sup> Dvornik claims it follows an example of Chinese, even though unclear too. He argues the Arab merchants visiting Chinggis Khan’s court quite possibly informed him on such a system established in China as well in the Abbasid Empire. He also emphasizes there hardly any documents leave an explanation of its origin and how it functions, and the only detailed accounts came from the writings from western visitors.<sup>21</sup> Dr. David Morgan agreed stating the Chinese had a postal system which operated in North China in the area of the Khitan Liao dynasty resembling the *yam* system before the Mongols even appeared. Even similarities of how they received foreign envoys and issued silver tablets marking authority, which Morgan claims, “are clearly the immediate ancestors of the

---

instituted the *yam* in 1234 as mentioned in *The Secret History of the Mongols* (pages 214-17 of the Rachewiltz 2004 edition).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 276.

<sup>18</sup> Morgan, 93.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 93. Morgan also mentions about how merchants and notable Mongols abused the *yam*, using a sufficient amount of forces “to enforce the compliance of the *yam* officials.” p. 90-1.

<sup>20</sup> Dvornik, 277. “how Jenghiz conceived the idea of organizing such an ingenious institution as a regular post with relays for obtaining rapid information, for nothing similar had existed during the time of the nomadic Mongols before him. Morgan, 93. “did the Mongols devise this remarkable institution themselves, or did they derive the idea from someone else?”

<sup>21</sup> Dvornik, 277-85. He states no remaining Mongolian records exist on the post system and of its importance in the empire, but “fortunately, we are in possession of some western sources which fill this gap and help us to see how this organization worked. These sources are the accounts of western envoys who had travelled to the courts of the khans and who often left us picturesque descriptions of their experiences.”

Mongol *paiza*.”<sup>22</sup> He also gives the Mongols credit for extending the post system model across the entirety of the empire.<sup>23</sup>

Several western visitors observed the *yam* system in action on their excursions throughout the Mongolian Empire. Of these visitors, the merchant Marco Polo, Friar Giovanni DiPlano Carpini, ambassador Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, and missionary William of Rubruck considered the most known of the visitors. All provide similar description of the *yam* but each also gives information on their different accounts of things they saw while travelling along it. The most positive accounts of the *yam* system in the western view came from Marco Polo. He described how a messenger only traveled a short distance of twenty-five miles for the next post station and illustrated the amenities of a station as very ‘spacious’ and ‘splendid,’ even in the most barren environments. He spoke on the exceptional amount of horses at a given post, 400 of them, and always ready for messengers trading for a new rested horse. Polo claimed the *yam*, “is surely the highest privilege and greatest resource ever enjoyed by any man on earth, king or emperor or what you will.”<sup>24</sup> He also gave compliments of another similar messenger system of unmounted couriers who ran from post to post delivering messages. They could cover a hundred days’ journey in only ten.<sup>25</sup>

Friar Giovanni DiPlano Carpini’s experience seemingly leaves a negative connotation of the operation of the *yam*. He described how the khan dispatched messenger, in an ad hoc manner, whenever he felt and chose who went. He also stated the messengers must receive horses and

---

<sup>22</sup> Morgan, 94.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 94. Morgan also states the search for the origins of the *yam* and its ‘influences’ gets quite out of hand, and historians should consider “anyone who is faced with the running of a large empire is likely to think, without being prompted, that a system of efficient couriers might be an idea worth considering.” p. 93.

<sup>24</sup> Marco Polo, *The Travels of Marco Polo*, translated by Ronald Latham (Baltimore: Penguin books, 1958), 122.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 121-4. Overall this seemingly is the most positive description of the *yam*. Concerning the unmounted couriers, each messenger only ran three miles to a station and pass on the message to another runner and so on. They wore belts with bells so the station could hear an uncoming runner approaching. The Mongols used this system for information in the immediate area of the capital, 100 days out. Polo also spoke how these runners delivered fresh fruit for Kubilai Khan over night, which suggests misuse of the service.

provisions without any delay no matter where they came from. He described how him and his caravan pushed their horses without remorse since they had news ones everyday and left exhausted horses behind so they could continue on without stopping.<sup>26</sup>

As ambassador for King Henry III of Castile and Leon of Spain, Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo journeyed into Anatolia, to the city of Samarkand, under control of Timur at the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. On his trip he witnessed the *yam* system still in effect after the collapse of the Mongol Empire. In his writings, he gave the same explanation of the *yam* and how messengers traded horses at each station; he also wrote on how if a messenger's horse ever tired while on the route he confiscate another from a bystander.<sup>27</sup> He went into further detail on how messengers pushed their horses so hard, they die between stations. He claimed spotting a large number of dead horses left on the sides of the roads from over exhaustion while moving about the area of the Golden Horde.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, William of Rubruck, a Franciscan monk, also wrote a detailed account of his journey through the Mongol Empire during the thirteenth century. He had previously participated on King Louis IX's crusade into Palestine. He then made a three year long journey into the empire in an attempt of converting Mongols to Christianity. On his travel toward the Mongol capital of Karakorum, he too experienced the *yam* system. In his writings of it, he described one part in particular at the river of Tanais.<sup>29</sup> He reported how the station attendants ferried his group across the river. First they transported Rubruck and his personnel using boats, and then carried

---

<sup>26</sup> Carpini, 65, 103, 106-7. Carpini also describes how he and his caravan travelled so hard from morning until night, not stopping to eat, that when they arrived at a post so late that they did not get to eat their food for dinner until the morning.

<sup>27</sup> Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, "Clavijo's Embassy to Tamerlane," trans. Guy Le Strange, <http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/clavijo/cltxt1.html> (accessed April, 7, 2009). If a messenger with dispatches from the khan needed another horse while enroute he was able to confiscate from anyone. Clavijo mentions how he was told Timur's son had to give up his horse for a messenger reporting to the royal court.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Crossing waterways fell upon the station's responsibilities for transporting travelers across. See note 11.

the carts across: placing each wheel of a cart in a boat, tie both boats together, and then row the whole cart across the water. He depicted how the station did not transport their horses across leaving him stranded for three days. The station attendants claimed, “they were exempted by Baatu from any service than ferrying across those who came and went.”<sup>30</sup> Their loss of horses and oxen suggests several conclusions of what happened: a group of messengers confiscated them, the post wanted money for transporting them, or did not enforce the traditional task of trading them out at the post.<sup>31</sup>

The Mongol Empire also sent out spies into enemy territory for intelligence gathering. Chinggis and his successors tried collecting any and all possible information on neighbors’ strength and use diplomacy for exploiting any weakness inside the structure of an opposing force.<sup>32</sup> Spies working for the Mongols prevented rebellious princes from the Georgians and the Armenians in 1249 illustrated great use of Mongol espionage. The Mongols punished the Georgians and Armenians for their plans of insurrection with a destructive campaign.<sup>33</sup> At the Mongol capital, Karakorum, spies reported political situations and conditions along with “the lack of unity amongst the Christian princes of Europe, of the weakening of the fighting forces caused by losses in the Crusades, and especially of the rivalry and hostility existing between the Pope and the Emperor Frederick II.”<sup>34</sup> This information came from the intelligence gathered

---

<sup>30</sup> William of Rubruck, “William of Rubruck’s Account of the Mongols,” trans. William Woodville Rockhill, <http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/rubruck.html> (accessed April 7, 2009). Information found in section IX: “Rubruck resumes his travel narrative.”

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. Messengers did confiscate horses if theirs’ died of exhaustion, but the case for Rubruck seems the station was corrupt. Rubruck stated, “From merchants even they collect much money,” meaning the station extorted money from its users. Most likely they wanted money for transporting Rubruck and his groups’ horses. He eventually convinced the station workers he worked for the “common good” of Christians, and they gave them enough horses and oxen for pulling their carts, leaving Rubruck and his group walking on foot.

<sup>32</sup> Dvornik, 275.

<sup>33</sup> Simon Payaslian, *The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 90. These princes came from the Zakarian dynasty who established a kingdom in the region years before. The Mongols imprisoned them in Karakorum for conspiring against them.

<sup>34</sup> Harold T. Cheshire, “The Great Tartar Invasion of Europe,” *The Slavonic Review*, 5, no. 13 (June, 1926): 89, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4202032> (accessed April 6, 2009).

from Sübedei's spies, natives of the Bulgaria and Russia, penetrating European countries from the Caspian Sea which created the plans for invasion and conquest of Europe.<sup>35</sup>

Many people today may not actually consider a Mongols spy a spy; in fact merchants moving about the empire conducted most of the spying, whether they knew or not. Chinggis Khan inquired much information from many Muslim merchants and learned the shah of the Kwharzmian Empire started wars against other Muslims as well as Christians. He dispatched a caravan of Muslim merchants west for information where the governor of Otrar, a Kwharzmian city, executed them. One man escaped and reported the events back to Chinggis and brought the ultimate decision for the conquest of the Kwharzmians.<sup>36</sup> The Mongols contracted merchants for intelligence gathering for reasons such as them knowing the trade routes throughout Asia, culturally inclined, and the best at observing economic situations of areas. They also traveled the most out of anybody in the empire, observing many things and built many contacts in numerous areas. Chinggis entertained many merchants traveling through Mongolia and gathered vast information and details so he could create his plans. Many merchants supported the Mongol cause for expansion seeing the benefits of protection of trade routes and easier connection between countries across the empire, opening up Asia for more trading.<sup>37</sup>

Another form of intelligence came from the use of scouts, or *alginchi*. Polo described the battle formations the Mongols and how they used four scouting elements of 200 warriors each (800 total). A forward scouting element rode two days' distance ahead of the main unit while the

---

This article argues Europe had no idea the Mongol based themselves in Russia for invasion and had full knowledge of their political conditions that later led to sack Moravia, Hungary, Croatia, and Dalmatia, while the Christians knew little or nothing about their enemy.

<sup>35</sup> Dvornik, 275. He argues Sübedei used intelligence gained from prisoners, merchants, and other Europeans.

Cheshire makes the claim Sübedei "captured Bolgari, the chief town of the Volga Bulgars, and then used the subjugated Mordva Finns as convenient spies and guides on his further march to the north-west," meaning Europe.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 269 and May, 70. The governor of Otrar informed the shah the capture of the merchants, Muhammad II ignored the tradition protecting envoys and gave the order of execution and the governor looted their belongings.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 274-75.

other three on flanks and rear of the battle group as a preventative measure against surprise attacks.<sup>38</sup> Carpini mentioned the scouts in his writings as well. He wrote about how they only took their weapons and tents while riding ahead never seizing, burning, or hunting anything. They only had one goal: put the opposing force into flight through wounding or killing enough of their men. Once in flight the army followed the enemy, destroyed them, and then raided for war bounties.<sup>39</sup> These scouts observed movements of enemy forces and probed areas in gathering any intelligence on their positions and camps.<sup>40</sup> They made contact with the main unit with a modified version of the *yam* or signal flags for reporting the information they found. Sending scouts out as reconnaissance for a major raid party was very common and had been conducted before unification of the steppe.<sup>41</sup> Recorded evidence of these scouts used is found in *The Secret History of the Mongols* where Chinggis Khan and Toghriq Ong-Qan allied and fought against Jamuqa.<sup>42</sup>

Lastly, expeditionary forces, the largest component of gathering intelligence for the Mongols, they used these moving west through Middle East and into Europe. Essentially, the primary mission of tracking down escaping enemies who did not submit in the empire provided intelligence as a secondary result. They gathered intelligence through “reconnaissance en force” finding information concerning plans for future conquests. Jebe and Sübedei’s hunt for

---

<sup>38</sup> Polo, 69.

<sup>39</sup> Carpini, 74.

<sup>40</sup> Dvornik, 275.

<sup>41</sup> May, 70-71.

<sup>42</sup> Igor De Rachewiltz, *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century* (Boston: Brill Leiden 2004), 63-64. In section 142 it reports how Chinggis Khan and Toghriq Ong Qan united against Jamuqa. They set up several observation points beyond the units. The scouts reported the movement of Jamuqa’s forces and consisted of Mongols, Naiman, Merkits, and the Oyirat clans.

Khwarazmian Empire's Sultan Muhammed II demonstrated a great example of intelligence gathering.<sup>43</sup>

The Mongols never left for any battle without intelligence of their enemies. They always had some information they uncovered and then used in planning attacks. They proved it time and again, while their enemies failed in this area of providing any good intelligence, if any at all. If the enemy did provide intelligence, the Mongols performed some form of counter-intelligence against them.<sup>44</sup> Through their use of military intelligence they developed detailed battle plans, proper troop deployment, and timing which helped them move across Asia and onto Europe's doorstep so quickly and helped them build the largest known empire in history.

---

<sup>43</sup> May, 71. Dvornik also described this expeditionary force of Jebe and Sübedei in his book on page 275. They used 30,000 men searching for Muhammed II north of the Caspian. Chinggis Khan gave them "three years to investigate and conquer the lands beyond the Caspian Sea, to find out what kind of peoples dwelt there, how important their realms appeared to be, and how strong were their armies."

<sup>44</sup> May, 80. He discusses the tactics of subterfuge. These tactics build up the number of forces than there actually present, a form of counter-intelligence. Tactics such as every soldier lighting five fires, dragging limbs behind horses, and dummies on spare horses are all forms of subterfuge.

## Bibliography

### Primary Sources:

Clavijo, Ruy Gonzalez de. "Clavijo's Embassy to Tamerlane." Translated by Guy Le Strange. <http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/clavijo/cltxt1.html> (accessed April, 7, 2009).

DiPlano Carpini, Giovanni. *The Story of the Mongols Whom We Call the Tartars*. Translated by Erik Hildinger. Boston: Branden Publishing Company, 1996.

Polo, Marco. *The Travels of Marco Polo*. Translated by Ronald Latham. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958.

Rubruck, William of. "William of Rubruck's Account of the Mongols." Translated by William Woodville Rockhill. <http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/rubruck.html> (accessed April 7, 2009).

*The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*. Translated by Igor de Rachewiltz. Vol. 1. Boston: Brill Leiden, 2004.

### Secondary Sources:

Cheshire, Harold T. "The Great Tartar Invasion of Europe." *The Slavonic Review* 5, no. 13 (June, 1926): 89-105. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4202032> (accessed April 6, 2009).

Dvornik, Francis. *Origins of Intelligence Services*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974.

May, Timothy. *The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System*. Yardly: Westholme Publishing, 2007.

Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. *A History of Warfare*. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968.

Morgan, David. *The Mongols*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.

Morgan, David. "Persian Perceptions of Mongols and Europeans." In *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting On the Encounters Between Europeans and other Peoples In the early Modern Era*, edited by Stuart B. Schwartz, 201-17. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1994.

Payaslian, Simon. *The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Spuler, Bertold. *History of the Mongols*. Translated by Helga and Stuart Drummond. New York: Dorset press, 1988.

Wittfogel, Karl A. "Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast." *Slavic Review* 22, no. 4. (December, 1963): 627-643. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2492560> (accessed April 8, 2009).